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Book Review
The African Philosophy Reader, edited by P.H. Coetzee and A.P.J. Roux, ISBN 0-415-96809-7.
The most distinctive feature of this anthology is that the editors have presented the ongoing philosophical
debate in Africa to a more multicultural audience in this edition than they did with the first. They have
achieved this feat by addressing the dialogue to more diverse worldviews and life experiences and by
reflecting the existential conditions not only in post-colonial Africa but also in post-apartheid South
Africa within the contexts of the 21st century and globalization.
This comprehensive multiculturalism is best reflected throughout the chapters in a kind of dualism
rightly termed “antiphony” by the editors. It features such contrasting voices as the dominant vs.
discordant, Black South African vs. White South African, and Anglophone vs. Francophone. Other
contrasting voices include Western vs. Non-western, modernism vs. postmodernism, particularism
vs. universalism and traditional vs. contemporary.
The book consists of eight large chapters, each with five to nine papers from well-seasoned African
researchers and writers .They include Professors Abiola Irele, Paulin Hountondji, Kwasi Wiredu,
Kwame Gyekye, Kwame Appiah, Odera Oruka, Gail M. Presbey, Ali Mazrui and Nobel Prize
laureate Wole Soyinka.
The chapter headings are:
Chapter 1: Discourses on Africa
Chapter 2. Trends in Africa
Chapter 3. Metaphysical Thinking in Africa. 
Chapter 4. Epistemology and the tradition in Africa
Chapter 5. Morality in African Thought 
Chapter 6. Race and Gender
Chapter 7. Justice and Restitution in African Political Thought
Chapter 8. African in the Global Context
Chapter 1 features various foundational discourses in African Philosophy. The main argument in
this chapter as borne by the nine essays is that while it is important to reject the negative images of
the African and African culture mere rejection is not enough. Examples of the negative images are
evident in the thought and practice of European racism, slavery, colonialism, neo-colonialism,
imperialism and their impact on Africa and Africans Many contemporary African writers have
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rightly rejected these negative images through Critical Theory, Negritude and Afrocentrism etc, but
it has become even more important to transcend this form of discourse in favor of cultural pluralism
or what Oruka terms “trans-cultural consciousness.”
The lead chapter in this section is that of Mogabe B. Ramose, ‘The Struggle for Reason.’ He traces
the tendency of the European to deny rationality (the mastery of logic, reason and science) and
hence human ontology and dignity to African and other non-Europeans to Aristotle. Aristotle
maintained not only that rationality was a necessary condition for being human but also that it was
non-existent among Blacks. On this premise he argued that slavery was justified because it was in
the interest of Blacks to have ‘white’ masters for guidance.
The rest of the authors agree with Ramose that this false and pernicious consciousness has been
nurtured over the centuries by such influential philosophers as Hume, Kant, and Hegel and has
served as the rationale for slavery, colonialism discrimination and other forms of Eurocentrism and
domination. For example, Irele presents Negritude not as a mere negative rejection of Eurocentrism
and Africa’s alienation as the “Other”, but as an inclusive cultural ideology contributing towards the
evolution of “broader humanism” and “a civilization of the Universal.” Similarly, Wiredu argues
not only against the Eurocentric rejection of African Traditional Religion as a valid form of
religion, but also calls for the decolonization of African Theology. Although Wiredu identifies
himself (in other contexts) as an atheist, his aim here is far from hostile to Christian theologians and
philosophers. His aim is to call attention to wrongness of certain narrow conceptions of religion
held within African Christian Theology so that it could admit of religious pluralism. A wider
conception of religion, he argues, will also more accurately reflect the diversity of beliefs about the
Supreme Being held in Africa, including skeptical and atheistic viewpoints. In the same spirit
Thiongo argues for the pluralism of cultures while Steve Biko call for “a true humanity” in which
all races and cultures are respected.
Reflecting on the current political scene, Ramose states “the condescendor currently manifests the
will to dominate through the imposition of democratization, globalization, and human right.” [P.2)
That Ramose is not opposed to these liberal values per se but the method of imposition by military
and economic might is borne in his cautionary follow-up statement; that (the catch-all concept)
‘democracy’ became inadvertently the route towards the inhumanity and irrationality of the
holocaust. While the comparison with the Nazi aggression is a little overstretched, the caution is
timely and necessary for introducing a dose of moderation to curb the hawkish tendencies within the
corridors of power bent on the hurried democratization of Iraq at virtually any cost.
The overall lesson from this chapter could not have been articulated better than in the following
quote from one of Aimee Cesaire’s famous poems used by Unguji Wa Thiong’ O, “There is no race
which held for all time the monopoly of beauty, intelligence, and knowledge; and that there was a
place for all at the rendezvous of victory, human victory.”
Chapter Two discusses the main trends in African Philosophy and identifies them as Ethno-
Philosophy, Philosophic Sagacity, Nationalist-Ideological and Philosophy, and Professional
Philosophy. The issues here are by no means new, having appeared in all or most of the anthologies
and texts for African Philosophy for the last three decades. Together they affirm the existence of
African Philosophy as a proper philosophical sub-field, as worthy of recognition as French
Philosophy, British Philosophy, Russian Philosophy and similar sub-fields. There is however no
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consensus on which of the trends satisfies the necessary conditions for being part of Philosophy or
what those conditions must be. Hountondji for example, insists that a written tradition as well as the
analytic-scientific tradition are necessary for any orientation to qualify as ‘Philosopher proper’.
Another trend, which qualifies as any other, is missing from the list: The Historical Hermeneutical
Philosophy. This is exemplified in the works of Leonard Harris, and Lucious Outlaw and is largely
responsible for uncovering and publicizing the implicit and nuanced racism within the writings of
various European philosophers from ancient times to the present including Aristotle, Hume, Kant
and Hegel.
The best attempt to resolve the demarcation debate on what is and is not African Philosophy I know
is that by Professor Kwame Gyekye. He argues for an inclusive approach that recognizes Ethno-
philosophy (the most controversial of all the trends) as Traditional African Philosophy since it does
not lack the critical reflection required of all philosophical discourses. Taking that as the starting
point he makes the case for incorporating all the other trends as part of a continuum that culminates
in contemporary African Philosophy with its multiple methodologies and issues.
Although philosophical debates can hardly be resolved by fiat, the recognition given to African
Philosophy by the American Philosophical Association, the world most popular and influential
philosophical organization cannot be ignored or taken lightly. By its formal recognition of Africana
(African and African-American) Philosophy in 1986 as a university course for the award of PhD in
the US, the APA has effectively taken the bite out of this debate. Consequently, the burden of proof
for showing why Africana Philosophy is not part of Philosophy proper now lies not with the
African Philosopher or his sympathizer, but with the skeptics and the exclusivists.
Consequently, many African scholars (including myself) have consequently resolved to move on
towards more substantive issues in philosophy . Our focus in research and teaching now is or
should be in response to the existential conditions in Africa through the framework of Social and
Political Philosophy, Africa’s Recent Experience, and more recently, Philosophy of Development
and Development Ethics. [See for example, Joseph Osei, Contemporary African Philosophy and
Development, Ann Arbor, UMI 1991]
Chapter 3. focuses on examples of metaphysical thinking in Africa. Metaphysical thinking is
unquestionably the gateway to African philosophy. It is the first place for any one seriously looking
for the existence of philosophical thinking in Africa could go for the most compelling evidence. For
here, the people - sophisticated and unsophisticated - raise and discuss the most fundamental
questions of philosophy regarding the existence of a creator (God or Supreme Being) and other
divine beings. They also discuss issues of destiny, freewill, cause, responsibility, the existence of
evil, the purpose of life, and the nature of a person. For example, the question is raised whether a
person is purely a physical being or dualistic with a spiritual or non-material aspect called soul or
mind.
Such discussions may be heard not just in formal lecture rooms, seminars, and churches, and local
radio talk shows. They are also heard in palm-wine and other drinking bars, Village Squares and in
the palaces of traditional rulers notable for eloquent and wise elders. Their metaphysical discussions
are often heard within the context of religious and moral issues. Such themes are well covered by
the essays in this chapter. The comparisons between the particularistic conceptual schemes of the
Yoruba and the Akan are useful in showing the similarities and the differences between their
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respective metaphysical worldviews.
In order to pave the way for science in Africa, however, it’s not enough to describe or to compare
these metaphysical concepts or to introduce new categories such as “primary cause” and “secondary
cause” as Sogolo does in ‘The Concept of Cause in African Thought.’ The more important
contribution to the discourse should be how to analyze and re-conceptualize these numerous
ontologies or beliefs so that they are assets rather than obstacles to scientific thinking as some of
them have proved to be.
Examples of this kind of analytic or critical metaphysics can be found in such works as Sodipo’s
‘Notes on the Concept of Cause and Chance in Yoruba Traditional Thought’ Second Order: An
African Journal of Philosophy (1975). Sodipo distinguishes between ‘personal’ explanations and
scientific explanations and cautions about letting the personal explanation take over too soon from
the scientific explanation. He also discourages letting the personal explanation dominate or
overshadow the scientific explanations by deferring to them only as last resort when all attempts at
scientific or (humanly) rational explanations seem to have failed. Another contribution of this kind
dealing with the concepts of destiny. the Supreme Being, and the gods etc. from the analytic
perspective can be found in Kudadjie and Osei’s chapter on ‘Understanding African Cosmology...’
in Faith, Science & African Culture: African Cosmology and Africa’s Contribution to Science,
C.W.Du Toit editor, (UNISA, 1998).
Chapter 4 is about epistemological issues and the tradition in Africa. The large space given for
discussing epistemological issues in this book is well deserved since it was on the grounds of the
African’s alleged epistemological incompetence that the question of the possibility of African
philosophy began in the first place. The key question in this regard is whether or not the African is
rational in the sense of possessing logical skills, wisdom, and capable of scientific thinking.
All the authors in this chapter address this issue and conclude that rationality so construed has
never been lacking in traditional African thought, past or present. The evidence includes references
to logical principles such as modus ponens and the laws of consistency and non-contradiction
without which inter-cultural discourses would be impossible or meaningless.
Consequently, they all reject the attempt by Senghor and other African writers to define the African
as essentially emotional in contrast to the Greek/white who is essential rational. To paraphrase the
argument by Kaphagawani and Malherbe, if the European could not recognize rationality in the
traditional African, it is only because the European mind (and not the African mind) was closed.
The two authors have also captured the trend of Africa’s epistemological thinking in what they
term, the “C4 factor: Contemporary Confluence of Cultures on the Continent.”
Once we recognize the new reality on the continent, as no longer homogenous or mono-ethnic (if it
ever was), but multi-ethnic and pluralistic, no longer traditional, but modern, we are logically led to
reject any form of ethno-centric and epistemology. And this includes the kind of ethnocentric
epistemology once advocated by Molefi Kete Asante’s as part of Afrocentrism in the Diaspora.1`
Such narrowly conceived epistemologies do not only generate confusion, they also undermine
confidence in well-established facts and scientific objectivity in general.
After rejecting such extremist and ethnocentric epistemologies, the new epistemological challenge
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becomes two-fold: First is the challenge of comparing, criticizing, and synthesizing the traditional
and the modern theories of truth and knowledge etc. as Wiredu does in The Concept of Truth in
Akan Language. Second, and more importantly for the African, is using these new epistemological
theories and principles as guidance for thought and action, especially in science and technology as
well as in ethics. We can also apply them to socio-economic and political thinking to promote
(total) development. As Wiredu has observed elsewhere, there should be no shame in borrowing
and adapting scientific models and ideas from the West or anywhere, “for the history of all cultures
is the history of cultural borrowing.”
Chapter 5 discusses Morality in African Thought. When African scholars describe the traditional
moral orientation as communitarian as distinct from the individualistic ethos of the West, critics
often attack it as a form of communism. Others think it is individualism suppressed by traditional
African authoritarianism. Such distortions of the traditional ethos have been corrected with the
essays showing the communitarian ethics to be authentic African values based on their indigenous
metaphysical assumptions. In the case of the Akans of Ghana, these include their normative
conceptions of personhood, (nipa,) and the tripartite conception of a person as body, signified by
blood from the mother) soul, (signified by okra from the Creator) and spirit (entoro signifying the
personality of the father).
These metaphysical beliefs serve as the basis of a network of family, extended-family and kinship
relationships that help define individual and communal identities and obligations as well as their
corresponding individual and communal rights. One distinction between the two ethical systems
noted by Professor Kwame Gyekye is worth stressing. Whereas the West derives obligations from
rights because of the primacy of place given to individualism, the African communal system derives
rights from the moral obligation because of the primacy of place given to communalism.
The emphasis on human rights in most of the essays in this chapter is significant for three main
reasons. First, it shows that communalism may share some of the social bonding and sharing
associated with communism but is by no means co-terminus with it since communism lacks the
human rights ethic. Second, the metaphysical foundation for the moral orientation shows beyond
reasonable doubt that human rights in the African context is neither borrowed nor veiled western
individualism which for the most part lacks communal bonding and caring. Third it shows that
those who contend that Africa lacks a human rights tradition and cannot consequently sustain
democracy for which such a transition is essential are wrong. (See Gyekye’s essay, ‘Traditional
Political Ideas and Values: An Examination of Their Relevance to Development in Contemporary
African Political Order,’ in Culture and Modernity,1990.)
Readers interested in detailed analysis of the human rights tradition and a comparison of the key
concepts with those found in western jurisprudence may want to look at ‘The Philosophical Bases
of Human rights in Akan Traditional Ethics’ by Joseph Osei in Human Rights in Ghana, Frederich
Ebert Foundation, Accra, 1998.
Chapter 6. deals with the touchy issues of Race and Gender. Many Black African women are not
only combating economic oppression and racism with their male counterparts, they also have to
bear the extra-burden of gender oppression and discrimination from their own people, especially the
wise and elderly in authority to protect them. Thanks to Marxist analysis colonialism and economic
oppression and exploitation in all their forms have now be uncovered and are now being confronted
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by all the means at our disposal. Also thanks to liberal analysis and criticisms, apartheid and other
forms of racist oppression on the continent and in the Diaspora have lost their stranglehold. The
arguments of W. E. Dubois as modified and amplified by Kwame Appiah with more contemporary
scientific evidence have proved the fallacies of racist theories and arguments beyond any reasonable
doubt. They have also clearly shown that those who disregard the counter-arguments and still hold
on to racism do so not because they any longer believe their racism to be rational but merely as a
form rationalizing or comforting ideology.
The same however cannot be said of female domination on the continent even at the beginning of
the 21st century, despite the best efforts of the Christian missionaries and other well-intentioned
Western educators for the last two centuries. Some of the means of female control and patriarchal
domination are hidden in idioms, proverbs, myths, and sacred or wisdom texts whose true origins
and meanings are not to be questioned by the ‘uninitiated.’ Since most women do not qualify for
the initiation necessary for their own enlightenment, the implication is that they are doomed to
submit to the ‘wisdom’ of the traditional elders all the days of their lives. But help is on the way.
With the research and critical writing of concerned non-African women such as Gail Presbey, there
is hope the plight of the least known of these women will be exposed to critical scrutiny by
philosophers and others until their yoke under traditionalism and patriarchy is broken. Her research
takes her to inner cities as well as villages in rural Africa where many fear to go. Instead of
imposing western values or standards on the people, as many Westerners do and alienate the people
they re trying to help, her approach is drawing attention to indigenous sayings and writings from
both male and females within the native traditions that challenge the status quo and become
sources of female empowerment. This is exemplified in her article ‘Should Women Love Wisdom?’
as well as in her other writings such as ‘Contemporary African Sages and Queen Mothers: Their
Leadership Roles in Conflict Resolution,’ in Peacemaking, by Sally Scholz and Judith Presler eds.
(2004).
Presbey does not only write and inspire African women to do the same on these issues but also
draws attention to their efforts and thus makes them more effective weapons against oppression.
Among these less known female ‘warriors’ she has brought to the center stage of philosophical
discourse are Florence Hetzler, Sohia…) Yeshi Mariam, (Ethiopian) Kavita Adgala (Kenyan)
Adefioye Oyesakan (Nigerian), Florence Dolphyne,(Ghanaian) and Scyla Benhabib (Ethiopian).
With the fight against apartheid (virtually) over, more African intellectuals, Blacks and Whites now
have the opportunity to join her and others in the fight for female liberation, and promote their
education. With that Appiah’s vision of non-racial and non-sexist pluralism could soon be realized
on the continent, so that one day our children could say, “In my father’s house (in Africa’s
universities and centers of political and economic power) are many mansions”- for all races as well
as for all genders.
The education of the African girl-child should be an overriding priority in all development theories
for as the Ghanaian philosopher Dr Kwegyir Aggrey of Achimota College once stated: If you
educate a man, you educate an individual, but if you educate a woman, you educate a, whole
family.”
Chapters 7&8 deal with the question of reparation of compensatory justice for Africa and can
therefore be conveniently discussed together. The authors examine the moral, legal and the
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empirical or historical grounds for such a demand against the Europe/West. This leads to a thorough
examination of Africa’s experiences from the time of European invasion, slavery, alienation in the
Diaspora, apartheid, colonialism, neo-colonialism and the applicable moral and legal principles
violated. The discussion extends to more contemporary experiences of faulty attempts at
development or globalization based on questionable European models, and their negative impacts on
African economies. These include deepening the twin evils of poverty and dependency. (The
discussions do not include how to break out of the cycle of poverty and dependency. Readers
interested in this issue are referred to Ali Mazrui’s book , The African Condition (1988) in which
he defends a theory of modernization for Africa with seven counter dependency strategies. These
strategies are critiqued, and adapted as part of a more general theory of development in Osei’s
paper, ‘Towards the Philosophy of Development’ Third World Studies Journal and Review, 1994.)
The western affront is also according to Ramose, a violation of Africa’s traditional principle of
Ubantu which is violated whenever we permit the profit motive philosophy to override the
collective human welfare philosophy.
For these reasons, the authors call for (symbolic and substantive) reparation as a form of
compensatory justice. The verbal apology expressed by the European states at the UN Conference
on Race Relations held in South Africa in 2001, although boycotted by the US, may be seen in this
light as part of the symbolic expression of the due reparation. The review and endorsement of
Present Mbeki’s concept of African Renaissance towards the end of the book is an important feature
of this book. For it could be deployed as the new guiding philosophy or ideology for Africa‘s
socio-economic and political integration that could also facilitate the demand for reparation and
overall justice within the global village.
In view of its potential for accelerating Africa’s development, one should not be too concerned with
what others might say about the origins of the terminology and whether it is borrowed from
European history, as Ramose does (in ‘African Renaissance’: A Northbound Gaze) Those who
prefer an African grounding for the concept can consider it as a derivation from the already familiar
Akan concept, Sankofaism. The term literally means ’the philosophy of going-back-for -it, and is
based on a maxim that says, “It is not a taboo to go back for a (valuable) thing one has forgotten.”
As long as the term can help mobilize all our moral and intellectual resources for Africa’s
development, let no semantic obstacles stand in our way.
The second edition was published in Great Britain by Routledge and also in Southern Africa by
Oxford University Press of South Africa (by special arrangement) in 2003. It has a total of 667
pages besides the3-page preface for the first edition and a 4-page preface for the second edition,
both written by the editors P. H. Coetzee and A. P. J. Roux. Each paper, with few exceptions, ends
with a comprehensive endnotes and list of references. Even more notable is the indexes of almost
17 pages in two columns, the most comprehensive to be found in any anthology in African
Philosophy to date. It is identified by ISBN 0-415-96809-7.
Reflecting their common admiration for the traditional African virtues of non-selfishness and
gratitude these philosophers have been careful not to limit the credit for their achievement to their
own efforts, but have liberally extended it to the whole Department of Philosophy and the
University of South Africa [UNISA] by acknowledging their funding and general support. To that
extent this new edition, more than its predecessor, represents a celebration of African culture as
well as a demonstration of UNISA’s commitment to reforming its curriculum and more importantly,
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a determination to provide exemplary leadership in reforming the South African society and Africa
at large.
In the spirit of the traditional African ethic of reciprocity we us reviewers and readers owe them a
special debt of gratitude. This gratitude can best be expressed not in words, but in buying, reading,
and recommending this book to the extended family of readers - in and out of Africa. This will
ensure that their effort will not be in vain but bear more fruits for nourishing more minds for
solving the myriad problems of Africa and our global village threatened by Tsunami and other
natural and man-made disasters.
Joseph Osei
Fayetteville State University
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